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The purpose of this study is to analyse the determinants of private fixed investment 
spending in Turkey over the period 1970–96, which covers years of both financial 
repression and financial liberalisation.  A reformulated neoclassical investment model and 
a reformulated flexible accelerator investment model have been tested for the Turkish 
economy.  The results obtained support the accelerator principle and the crowding out 
hypothesis, that is, public and private sector investments have been found to be 
substitutes.  Furthermore, the hypothesis that the volume of funds is as important as the 
cost of funds used in financing private fixed investment has been verified.  On the other 
hand, the so-called McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis has not been completely verified because 
the effect of the medium-term real lending rate on private fixed investment has been found 
to be negative but statistically insignificant.  Finally, the financial and liberalisation 
programmes that have been implemented since 1983 have not yet shown any noticeable 
positive effects on private investment. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This study attempts to specify the determinants of private fixed capital 
formation in less developed countries (LDCs) in general, and of the Turkish 
economy in particular, and to determine the interrelationship between public and 
private investments.  Understanding what determines investment expenditure is 
crucial to understanding a major source of fluctuations in aggregate demand. 
One of the important objectives of this study is to provide a new framework to 
clarify the determinants of private fixed investment behaviour empirically by 
examining the Turkish economy.  We wish to ascertain whether public total fixed 
investment and private fixed investment are substitutes or complements and then to 
make a distinction between public investment in infrastructure and government 
investment of other kinds in order to answer the question:  Did higher public capital 
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accumulation “crowd out” or “crowd in” private fixed investment in Turkey during 
the period 1970–96?  For this time period, we also want to determine empirically 
whether the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis can be verified for the Turkish economy. 
The plan of the paper is as follows:  the two base models for fixed investment 
behaviour are presented in Section II.  The reformulated modifications of the base 
models and the estimated results are discussed in Section III.  Concluding remarks 
are made in Section IV.  The definition of the variables and the sources of data are 
presented in the Appendix. 
 
II.  THE BENCHMARK MODELS OF THE DETERMINANTS  
OF PRIVATE FIXED INVESTMENT 
This section will develop an investment model that can be used as a 
benchmark model to explain the determinants of private fixed investment behaviour 
in both developed countries (DCs) and LDCs.  The next section will broaden the 
benchmark model to explain the determinants of fixed investment spending in LDCs 
and then apply the modified model to the Turkish economy. 
Alternative models of private fixed investment behaviour differ in the 
determinants of the optimal level of capital, in the characterisation of the time 
structure of the fixed investment processes, and in the treatment of replacement 
investment.1  Of the three, the most important one is the determinants of the optimal 
level of capital, and hence alternative models of investment behaviour differ 
substantially in the determinants of desired level of capital.  Desired capital depends 
on output, capacity utilisation, internal funds, the cost of external finance, the 
Tobin’s average q, and other variables.  The time structure of the private fixed 
investment process, on the one hand, has been represented by finite, rational, and 
geometric distributed lag functions.  On the other hand, it has been represented by an 
eclectic formulation of rational or geometric distributed lag functions, with the first 
weight or the first few weights arbitrary and the remaining weights declining 
geometrically.  Finally, models of private fixed investment behaviour differ in their 
treatment of replacement investment, but almost all investment studies that include 
replacement investment explicitly assume that replacement investment is 
proportional to the existing capital stock. 
We will derive the benchmark model of private fixed investment behaviour by 
using the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation.  We use a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function to represent the production 
technology in the following form: 
ρ
−δ−+δ= ρ−ρ− vLKAQ ])1([  … … … … … (1) 
 
1Some surveys of alternative investment models are given in Chirinko (1993); Celebi (1995); 
Jorgenson (1996, 1996a); Junankar (1972) and Serven and Solimano (1992). 
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where A, v, ρ, and δ are unknown parameters and K and L are the amount of capital 
and labour employed in the production process, respectively. The unknown 
parameter A represents the Hicks-neutral technological progress (A>0), v is the 
returns-to-scale parameter (v>0), ρ is the substitution parameter (ρ>–1), and δ is the 
distribution parameter (0 < δ < 1) that relates the share of output to the two inputs. 
A profit-maximising firm facing a perfectly competitive rental market for 
capital will hire additional capital input up to the point where its marginal revenue 
product equals the user cost of capital, c.  Under perfect competition the user cost of 
capital reflects opportunity costs, depreciation costs, and tax costs, and is given by2 
u
uzqdrqc −
−∆−+=
1
1])([ , … … … … … (2) 
where q is the price of capital goods, r is the medium-term nominal interest rate, d is 
the rate of depreciation, u is the tax rate, and z is the present value of the depreciation 
deduction based on the straight-line depreciation method on one Turkish Lira’s 
investment (after the investment tax credit).  Solving the first-order conditions for 
profit maximisation and assuming constant returns-to-scale in the production process 
give the firm’s demand for optimum level of capital, conditional on output, as 
follows:3 
Q
c
AK
σ
−σσ 

 ρδδ= 1* , … … … … … (3) 
where σ is the elasticity of substitution of capital for labour. 
One of the main criticisms concerning the characteristics of technology can 
be summarised as follows:4  Vintage effects may influence the relation between 
past fixed investments and the physical capital stock entering the production 
function.  At one extreme, vintage effects are absent if capital is “putty-putty”.  
This assumption implies that the period in which capital good is purchased is of no 
particular importance.  Following the “putty-putty” hypothesis requires unitary 
elasticity of substitution of capital for labour in the production process, and gives 
the following first benchmark model as a demand for capital conditional on the 
level of output:5 
 
2The user cost of capital was first formulated by Jorgenson and used in almost all private fixed 
investment studies based on the neoclassical theory of optimal accumulation.  See Jorgenson (1996, 1996a). 
3See Eisner (1969); Eisner and Nadiri (1968) and Jorgenson (1996). 
4See Chirinko (1993). 
5A constant elasticity of substitution production function with unitary elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour inputs reduces to a Cobb-Douglas production function.  Jorgenson and Hall 
and Jorgenson used a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant-returns-to-scale in their investment 
studies.  Hence, our equation for the desired level of capital—Equation (4A)—is similar to theirs. 
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c
K ρδ=  … … … … … … (4A) 
At the other extreme, vintage effects do matter if capital is “putty-clay”.  The 
“putty-clay” hypothesis that requires the fixed proportions production function is 
widely used in empirical studies because many capital goods require a certain 
number of people to run them, and hence any excess of capital or labour is 
superfluous.  In the planning stage there may be substantial possibilities for 
substituting capital for labour, but the “putty” hardens into “clay” once investment 
decisions have been made, and the capital goods have to be used with a specified 
amount of labour.  As a result of following the “putty-clay” hypothesis, substituting 
zero elasticity of substitution of capital for labour into Equation (3) gives the second 
benchmark model of the demand for capital, conditional on the level of output, as 
follows: 
K* = γQ, where γ = A–1 … … … … … (4B) 
Since investment decisions at time t, designated by the change in the 
determinants of optimal capital stock, affect capital expenditures in the current and 
future periods, until the appropriated investment projects are completed, we may 
say—equivalently—that current private net fixed investment expenditures at time t 
(NIPt) are a function of the changes in current and past demands for output as 
follows: 
it
i
i
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To convert the economic models (5A) and (5B) to statistical models, we 
include εt, independent identically distributed random variable with zero mean and 
constant variance.  To solve the difficulty arising from estimating an infinite number 
of unknown parameters with a finite amount of data, we apply the so-called Koyck 
transformation to the statistical models.  Finally, we assume that the replacement 
investment in each interval of time is a fixed proportion of the existing capital stock.  
Under these assumptions, we derive the benchmark models of the private gross fixed 
investment expenditure in period (IPt) as follows: 
ttt
t
t dKPNIPQc
IP ε++λ+

 ρδ∆λ−µ= −− 11)1( , … … … (6A) 
( ) ttttt dKPNIPQIP ε++λ+γ∆λ−µ= −− 11)1( . … … … (6B) 
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III.  THE MODIFICATION OF THE BENCHMARK MODELS 
AND ESTIMATED RESULTS 
This section will broaden the benchmark models discussed earlier and include 
other possible determinants of private fixed investment expenditure in LDCs, and 
then will apply the modified models to the Turkish economy for the period 1970–96. 
McKinnon and Shaw suggested that high positive real interest rates would 
raise domestic savings, would increase the volume of domestic credits, and thereby 
would raise the equilibrium rate of investment because they assumed that the 
principal constraint on investment was the quantity, rather than the cost, of financial 
resources.6 
It is widely accepted that in LDCs private fixed investment and public fixed 
investment are related to each other even though there is considerable uncertainty 
about whether public sector total fixed investment raises or lowers private fixed 
investment.7  We want to make a distinction between public investment in infrastructure 
and government investment of other kinds in order to answer the question:  Does 
higher public capital accumulation “crowd out” or “crowd in” private fixed 
investment?  Since the study by Blejer and Khan (1984), enough empirical evidence 
has been available to allow testing that the effect on private fixed investment would 
depend on the type of public fixed investment in question. 
In broad terms, the financing of both public sector infrastructure and non-
infrastructure investment—whether through taxes, issuance of debt, or inflation—
decreases the economy’s physical and financial resources available to the private 
sector, and thus crowds out private fixed investment.  On the other hand, an increase 
in public sector total fixed investment—either infrastructure or non-infrastructure—, 
ceteris paribus, raises aggregate output and savings, supplementing the economy’s 
physical and financial resources, and hence offsets at least some part of initial 
crowding out effects. 
In particular, public infrastructure investment, such as that in highways, water 
and sewerage lines, and communications systems, reduces the private sector’s cost of 
production and distribution or increases the returns to scale and hence raises the 
profitability of private fixed investment.  This crowds in private fixed investment 
activity.  On the other hand, since public infrastructure investment raises the 
productivity of the private capital stock, it reduces the private fixed investment 
requirements per unit of output and thus crowds out private investment.  Therefore, 
unlike other economists, we believe that the overall effect of public infrastructure 
investment on private fixed investment depends on the relative strength of these 
various effects, and there is no a priori reason to believe that public sector 
 
6See McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
7The relationship between public and private fixed investments for LDCs is studied in Blejer and 
Khan (1984); Chhibber and Wijnbergen (1988); Chhibber, Dailami and Shafik (1992); Celebi (1995, 
1998); Wai and Wong (1982) and Wijnbergen, Anand, Chhibber, and Rocha (1992). 
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infrastructure investment crowds out or crowds in private fixed investment.  
However, public sector non-infrastructure investment is, on balance, more likely to 
crowd out private fixed investment because not only does it utilise scarce physical 
and financial resources that would otherwise be available to the private sector but 
also produces marketable output that competes with private output. 
Capacity utilisation in almost all sectors is low in LDCs relative to DCs due to 
several reasons.  It is obvious that the level of capacity utilisation has a significant 
impact on the timing of private fixed investment spending.  If capacity utilisation is 
low, then private fixed investment spending will remain sluggish even if the 
determinants of optimal capital stock are expected to change positively and rapidly 
later on.  The capacity utilisation rate can also be employed to control for the 
influence of the business cycle in explaining private fixed investment spending in 
LDCs. 
Following the discussions above, Equation (6A) can be modified in a semilog 
functional form as a reformulated neoclassical investment model for a developing 
economy as 
IPt = a0 + a1∆log(PQ/c)t + a2∆log(PQ/c)t–1 + a3logNIPt–1 + a4logKPt–1  
+ a5logCRDPt+a6logCUPt–1 + a7logImt + a8logIGIt–1 + a9logIGNt–1  
+ a10D83 +εt … … … … … … (7A) 
where εt is the white noise and the other variables are defined in the Appendix.  The 
coefficients a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, and a7 are expected to be positive, whereas a9 
negative, and a8 and a10 either.  The second benchmark model to be tested here is 
given by the modification of Equation (6B) as a reformulated flexible accelerator 
model of investment as follows8 
IPt = b0 + b1∆Q3 + b2NIPt–1 +b3KPt–1 + b4CRDPt + b5rt + b6(∆π/π)t + b7Imt  
+ b8IGIt–2 + b9 IGNt–2 + b10D83 + εt … … … … (7B) 
The coefficients b1, b2, b3, b4, and b7 are expected to be positive, whereas b6 
and b9 negative, and b5, b8, and b10 either. 
Both models are estimated using annual data set for the period 1970–96 for 
the Turkish economy using ordinary least squares. 9   The best fitting lag is 
determined by comparing different lags with regard to the goodness of fit.  The 
estimated results are given by Equations (8A), (8B), (9A), (9B), and (9C).  The most 
important difference between the two sets of Equations (8A and 8B) and (9A, 9B, 
 
8When σ = 0, the neoclassical model reduces to the flexible accelerator investment model of 
Chenery and Koyck, and if deliver lags are absent, to the simple (rigid) accelerator model of Clark.  See 
Chirinko (1993); Celebi (1995); Eisner and Nadiri (1968); Jorgenson (1996); Junankar (1972) and Koyck 
(1954). 
9The determinants of private fixed investment of the Turkish economy for different periods are 
studied in Chhibber and Wijnbergen (1988); Celebi (1995, 1998); Rittenberg (1990) and Wijnbergen, 
Anand, Chhibber, and Rocha (1992). 
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9C) is that the former contains public sector total fixed investment, whereas the latter 
contains public sector infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments. 
IPt= –155474.41+81.43∆log(PQ/c)t+69.61∆log(PQ/c)t–1+2445.42 logNIPt–1+8790.14 logKPt–1 
         (–6.40)         (2.99)*            (2.50)*             (3.27)*           (4.13)* 
        +4862.68 log CRDPt+11803.33 logCUPt–1 – 5914.79 logTIGt–1 – 809.14 D83 
         (3.54)*                     (2.54)*               (–6.23)*              (–0.91) 
              D–W=2.01               F8,18=116.59          Adj. R2=0.9727   … (8A) 
IPt= –5769.84+1.71∆Q3+0.15KPt–1+0.25CRDPt–29.51rt–6.41(∆π/π)t–0.63TIGt–1–2624.21 D83 
         (–5.23)*  (5.94)*     (5.52)*      (1.82)*       (–1.35)  (–1.12) (–3.43)*    (–2.95)* 
                 D-W=1.64        F7,19=111.42    Adj. R2=0.9675    … (8B) 
IPt= –126521+69.34∆log(PQ/c)t+54.44∆log(PQ/c)t–1+2231.12 logNIPt–1+6130.65 
         (–4.1)     (2.51)*       (1.82)**       (2.37)*         (2.47)* 
        logKPt–1+4153.97 logCRDPt+8172.45 logCUPt–1+1237.95 logIMt–2372.94 logIGIt–1 
         (1.76)**         (1.58)         (0.79)   (–1.45) 
        –2116.99 logIGNt–1–1397.41 D83 
          (–2.43)*          (–1.29) 
                   D-W=1.98       F10,16=94.22         Adj. R2=0.9729      … (9A) 
IPt= –1497.27+0.49∆Q3+0.21 NIPt–1+0.05 KPt–1+0.31 CRDPt–44.15rt–1.25(∆ π/π)t 
        (–1.20)     (2.11)*    (1.28)           (1.76)**    (2.57)*   (–2.77)*   (–0.37) 
        +0.82 Imt+0.97 IGIt–2–1.98 IGNt–2–1550.07 D83 
         (2.09)*    (3.88)*     (–4.03)*  (–2.15)* 
                D-W=2.31         F10,16=236.71     Adj. R2=0.9891     … (9B) 
IPt= 266.87+0.34∆Q3+0.39 NIPt–1+0.29 CRDPt–8.68 rt* + 1.03Imt+0.829 IGIt–2–1.159 IGNt–2 
        (0.36)    (1.94)*    (3.03)*      (1.94)*         (–0.48)        (2.83)*   (4.19)*  (–2.71)* 
        –1563.13 D83 
             (–2.16)* 
 D-W=2.20      F8,18=226.32    Adj. R2=0.9858 … … (9C) 
The computed t-values are given in parentheses.  Statistically significant 
coefficients at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels (or below) are marked 
by (*) and (**), respectively. 
The regression results of all estimated equations indicate that the estimated 
coefficients have expected signs, and in most cases they are statistically significant at 
α = 0.10 level.  Both adjusted R2 and F are quite high.  The F-test shows that the 
models can explain the variation in private fixed investment at α = 0.01 level.  At the 
α = 0.01 significance level, the Durbin-Watson test shows that there is no 
autocorrelation in the models. 
The most important aspect of the reformulated neoclassical investment model, 
Equations (8A) and (9A), is to find out the impact of the changes in real output 
weighted by the relative prices on private fixed investment spending for a developing 
economy.  To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to find out the impact of this 
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variable for a developing economy. The results indicate that the estimated 
coefficients of the changes in real output weighted by the relative prices are positive 
and statistically significant. 
Although the two models tested here can explain the variation in the private 
fixed investment spending satisfactorily because the minimum adjusted R2 found 
here is 0.9675, the reformulated flexible accelerator model, Equations (8B), (9B), 
and (9C), fits the data better according to the goodness of fit based on adjusted R2 
and low standard error. 
The Equations (8A) and (8B) clearly show that public sector total fixed 
investment has statistically significant, quantitatively quite large, and negative effect 
on private investment, meaning that public sector total fixed investment crowds out 
private fixed investment. 
The Equations (9A), (9B), and (9C) clearly show that the coefficient of public 
non-infrastructure investment is negative and statistically significant, which is in 
agreement with other studies.  This result implies that public non-infrastructure 
investment and private fixed investment are clearly substitutes.  However, the two 
models tested here do not provide consistent results about the effect of public sector 
infrastructure investment. The flexible accelerator model indicates that public 
infrastructure investment and private investment are complements, whereas the 
neoclassical model does not confirm this conclusion.  This may be due to the fact 
that the dependent variable includes fixed investments in ten sectors, of which the 
four major sectors, agriculture, manufacturing, transportation and communications, 
and construction, constitute about 90 percent of total private fixed investment.  
Disaggregating the private fixed investment into these four major sectors and then 
estimating each of them separately will most likely produce consistent results. 
The results show that the availability of credit to the private sector is 
significantly important in explaining private investment, which is also in agreement 
with other studies on investment for LDCs. The so-called McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis has not been completely verified because the medium-term real interest 
rate in Equation (9C) is negative but statistically insignificant. 
The financial and liberalisation programmes that have been implemented 
since 1983 have not yet shown any positive effects on private fixed investment.  
They would have affected private capital formation positively only if the bank 
deposits and real capital goods had not been close substitutes, the banking sector had 
efficiently distributed domestic credits, and the public sector borrowing requirements 
had been reduced.  Our results do not support this sequence of events because the 
financial and liberalisation programmes have dramatically increased not only public 
sector borrowing requirements but also real interest rates. 
The effect of uncertainty and instability in the macroeconomic climate 
(represented by the percentage change in the annual inflation rate) on private 
investment has been found to be negative but not statistically significant.  An 
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increase in the capacity utilisation index (used to control the effects of the business 
cycle on private fixed investment) in a given year is followed by a large increase in 
private fixed investment spending during the following year. The effect of the 
volume of imported investment goods on private fixed investment has been found to 
be statistically significant, quantitatively quite large, and positive, showing that the 
dependency of private capital formation on imported investment goods is quite large. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study has been to analyse the impact of government 
policy on private fixed investment spending in Turkey over the period 1970–96, 
which covers years of both financial repression and financial liberalisation. As 
pointed out earlier, the results obtained support the accelerator principle and the 
crowding out hypothesis. 
The hypothesis that the volume of funds is as important as the cost of funds 
used in financing private fixed investment has been verified since both the quantity 
and the cost of credit have had significant impacts on private investment.  The effect 
of real domestic credits granted to the private sector on private investment spending 
has been found to be statistically significant, quantitatively strong, and positive in 
both models.  The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis has not been completely verified 
because the effect of the medium-term real lending rate on private investment has 
been found to be negative but statistically insignificant. 
Public sector total fixed investment has had statistically significant, 
quantitatively quite large, and negative effects on private fixed investment in both 
models.  This clearly indicates that public sector total fixed investment, on balance, 
crowds out private fixed investment.  Moreover, public sector non-infrastructure 
fixed investment has had statistically significant, quantitatively quite large, and 
negative effects on private fixed investment, meaning that public sector non-
infrastructure fixed investment and private sector fixed investment are substitutes.  
However, the results obtained from the two models are not robust about the effect of 
public sector infrastructure investment on private fixed investment.  The result of the 
flexible accelerator model indicates that public infrastructure investment and private 
investment are complements, whereas the neoclassical model does not confirm this 
conclusion. Disaggregating private investment into four major sectors and estimating 
each separately will most likely produce consistent results. 
 
APPENDIX 
THE DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
The basic sources for the data used in Section III are the State Planning 
Organisation (SPO), the State Institute of Statistics (SIS), T. R. Central Bank 
(TRCB), and the Ministry of Finance (MF).  The data were deflated by the GNP 
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deflator (1987=1.00) to express them in real terms. 
 CRDP: The real domestic credits granted to the private sector, at 1987 prices, 
billion TL. Source: TRCB and SIS. 
 CUP: Private sector capacity utilisation in the manufacturing industry.  Source: 
SPO and SIS. 
 π: Inflation rate measured by the GNP implicit deflator.  Source: SIS. 
 ∆π/π: The percentage change in inflation measured by the GNP implicit 
deflator.  Source: SIS. 
 Q: Real gross national products given by (PQ/P). 
 ∆Q3: The change in moving average of real GNP of the previous three years 
given by the following formula:  ∆Q3=((∆Q)t–1+ (∆Q)t–2+( ∆Q)t–3)/3. 
 D83: The intercept-dummy variable measuring the effect of the financial 
liberalisation programme on the private fixed investment takes the value 
of 1 for the 1983–96 and 0 for the other years. 
 r: The medium-term nominal interest rate.  Source: TRCB. 
 r*: The medium-term real interest rate.  r*=(r–π)/(1+π).  Source: TRCB and 
SIS. 
 IGI: Public sector gross fixed infrastructural investment deflated by a public 
investment goods price index, at 1987 prices, billion TL.  It includes 
irrigation, power, transportations, communications, tourism, health, 
education, and water and sewerage systems.  Source: SPO. 
 IGN: Public sector gross fixed non-infrastructural investment deflated by 
public investment goods price index, at 1987 prices, billion TL.  Source: 
SPO. 
 Im: The real investment-goods imports, at 1987 prices, billion TL.  Source: 
SPO, SIS. 
 IP: Private sector gross fixed investment deflated by a private sector 
investment goods price index, at 1987 prices, billion TL.  Source: SPO. 
 KP: Private sector fixed capital stock, at 1987 prices, billion TL. 
 NIP: Private sector net fixed investment, at 1987 prices, billion TL. NIPt=IPt–
d*KPt–1. 
 P: The GNP implicit deflators index (1987=1.00).  Source: SIS. 
 PQ: Nominal gross national product, billion TL.  Source: SIS. 
 Pp: Private sector fixed investment deflator (1987=1.00).  Source: SPO. 
 TIG: Public sector real gross fixed investment, billion TL. TIGt=IGIt+IGNt. 
 u: The tax rate.  Source: MF. 
 z: The present value of the depreciation deduction on one Turkish Lira’s 
investment (after investment tax credit).  Source: MF. 
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